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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Susan McGary appeals the grant of summary judgment for Susquehanna Health 
System (“Susquehanna Health”), its wholly owned subsidiary Williamsport Regional 
Medical Center (the “Medical Center” or the “hospital”), and related employees 
Dr. George Manchester, Dr. Scott Croll, Dr. John Burks,1 and Dr. Mark Osevala2 
(collectively, the “Defendants”) on her antitrust and related state law claims.  We will 
affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Dr. McGary is a board-certified cardiothoracic (“CT”) surgeon.  For nearly a 
decade, she practiced CT surgery at the Medical Center.  She left in 2007 but, four years 
later, decided she wanted to return and sought employment there again.  The Medical 
Center, however, did not offer her a position because, it explained, it did not have enough 
work to support another CT surgeon in addition to Dr. Osevala, the sole CT surgeon on 
staff.   
Dr. McGary decided to open her own private practice instead, but she still needed 
access to the Medical Center’s facilities to perform surgery.  As an “open staff” facility, 
the hospital allows private practitioners to apply for staff privileges.  (App. at 1182-83.)  
Dr. McGary did so in January 2012.  At the time she applied, the Medical Center had 
                                                 
1 The spelling of Dr. Burks’s last name is inconsistent in the record, but we use 
“Burks” to be consistent with the parties’ filings. 
 
2 Drs. Croll, Burks, and Osevala are employed by non-party Susquehanna 
Physicians Services, a wholly owned subsidiary of Susquehanna Health.  Dr. Manchester 
is employed by Susquehanna Health.   
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credentialing criteria that required applicants for CT surgery privileges to have performed 
at least 100 heart surgeries and 100 lung surgeries within the previous year (the “100/100 
criteria”).  Those credentialing criteria were actually established while Dr. McGary was 
one of two “leaders” of the hospital’s CT surgery program.3  (App. at 849 ¶¶ 19-20.)  
When applying for staff privileges in 2012, however, Dr. McGary did not have the recent 
experience required by the 100/100 criteria.   
Susquehanna Health’s Medical Bylaws set forth procedures for processing 
applications, including escalating levels of review.4  Dr. Manchester, the hospital’s Chief 
                                                 
3 While Dr. McGary contends that she played no role in their adoption, the 
Defendants assert that she was involved in setting the criteria.  
 
4 The Medical Staff Bylaws provide: 
The completed application form shall be submitted to the Medical 
Director’s Office along with any application fee.  Upon receipt of the 
application, the Medical Director shall notify the CEO of Susquehanna 
Health and the President of the Medical Staff.  A summary of the 
application information shall be transmitted to the Credentials Committee 
and the Chairman of each department in which the applicant seeks clinical 
privileges. 
 
(App. at 153 ¶ 5.2-1.)  
According to the Bylaws, the Department Chairman then reviews the applicant’s 
information, may interview the applicant, and transmits a written report within thirty days 
to the Credentials Committee with the Chairman’s recommendations and reasoning for 
such recommendations.  Within sixty days of receiving the Department Chairman’s 
report, the Credentials Committee is required to submit a written report containing its 
recommendations and rationales to the Medical Executive Committee.  Within sixty days 
of receiving that report, that Committee is required to make its appointment 
recommendation.  If the Medical Executive Committee recommendation is unfavorable, 




Medical Officer, reviewed Dr. McGary’s application but quickly realized she did not 
meet the 100/100 criteria.  After discussing her application with Dr. Croll, who is the 
Chairman of the Medical Center’s Surgery Department, and with Dr. Burks, the Director 
of the Heart and Vascular Institute at the hospital, Dr. Manchester deemed her application 
incomplete and did not pass it along for further review.  Dr. Manchester informed 
Dr. McGary that she did not satisfy the Medical Center’s credentialing criteria and that 
her application would not be submitted for further review.   
When Dr. McGary learned that her application had been denied, she suggested to 
Dr. Manchester that the 100/100 criteria were too stringent and that the Medical Center 
should be satisfied with her record as it stood.  At Dr. Manchester’s request, she 
researched CT surgery credentialing criteria at other hospitals in the area.  That research 
prompted the hospital to revise its criteria.  Nonetheless, believing she was still ineligible, 
Dr. McGary did not reapply.  Instead, she opened a private outpatient vein surgery 
practice and filed this lawsuit.   
In her six-count amended complaint, she alleges violations of Sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, and the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Constitution.    She also asserts state law claims for breach of contract, 
interference with prospective contractual relationships, and conspiracy in restraint of 
trade.     
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The District Court dismissed Dr. McGary’s due process and equal protection 
claims, leaving her to proceed on her antitrust and state law claims.5  Following 
discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims.  The 
District Court granted that motion.  Dr. McGary has timely appealed.   
II. DISCUSSION6 
 Dr. McGary asserts that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Defendants on her claim for unlawful combination or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, her claims for monopolization and 
attempted monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and her state law claims 
for breach of contract, interference with prospective contractual relationships, and 
                                                 
5 The due process and equal protection claims are not before us on this appeal.  
Neither is her claim for injunctive relief, which was also dismissed.   
 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment de novo and “view inferences to be drawn from the underlying 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Montanez v. Thompson, 603 
F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  “Summary judgment is appropriate 
where the [c]ourt is satisfied ‘that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (citation omitted).  A genuine dispute exists only if 
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 




conspiracy in restraint of trade.  Despite the doctor’s disappointment, the District Court 
was correct.   
A. Claim Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations[.]”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  To prevail on a claim under Section 1, 
“a plaintiff must prove: (1) concerted action by the defendants; (2) that produced anti-
competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets; (3) that the 
concerted actions were illegal; and (4) that [she] was injured as a proximate result of the 
concerted action.”  Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2005).   
The District Court granted summary judgment on Dr. McGary’s Section 1 claim 
because it concluded that the Defendants were, as a matter of law, a single entity and thus 
were incapable of concerted action.  Dr. McGary challenges that conclusion.  She argues 
that Dr. Osevala had personal economic interests in excluding her from practicing at the 
Medical Center—namely, an incentive bonus7 and his fear of losing his job—that were 
separate and apart from the “institutional” Defendants’ “economic interest” in excluding 
her.  (Opening Br. at 25.)   
“Unilateral action, no matter what its motivation, cannot violate [Section] 1.”  
Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 639 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  
Concerted action requires two or more distinct entities to agree to take action.  Weiss v. 
                                                 
7 Dr. Osevala’s employment agreement includes an “Incentive Compensation” 
clause (App. at 253 ¶ 6) that gives him a percentage of receipts above expenses.   
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York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 813 (3d Cir. 1984).  Hence, a parent company is incapable of 
conspiring with its wholly owned subsidiary in violation of Section 1.  See Copperweld 
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (explaining that those entities 
“have a complete unity of interest”).  The same is true, in the typical case, of a company 
and its officers and employees.  Id. at 769.   
There are, however, exceptions to that general rule.  For example, where “a single 
entity [is] made up of independent, competing economic entities”—as is true at a hospital 
with medical professionals who are in competition with one another—those individuals 
constitute independent actors capable of agreement with one another in violation of 
Section 1.  Weiss, 745 F.2d at 816.  In addition, if “employees act for their own interests, 
and outside the interests of the corporation, they are legally capable of conspiring with 
their employer[.]”  Id. at 813 n.43. 
The question, then, is whether any combination of the Defendants in this case is 
capable of concerted action.  Dr. McGary could try to satisfy that requirement in one of 
several ways: by alleging concerted action between the “institutional” entities, 
Susquehanna Health and the Medical Center; between two or more of the individual 
doctor Defendants; or between Susquehanna Health and/or the Medical Center and one or 
more of the individual doctor Defendants.  Each of those potential combinations, 
however, fails to provide the doctor with the foothold she seeks.  
Here, Susquehanna Health is incapable of concerted action with the Medical 
Center because the Medical Center is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Susquehanna Health.  
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.  There is also no evidence that the individual doctor 
8 
 
Defendants were in competition with one another or would be in competition with 
Dr. McGary, except Dr. Osevala.  Indeed, all of the evidence indicates that, apart from 
Dr. Osevala, the doctor Defendants, none of whom practice CT surgery, would be 
unaffected by Dr. McGary’s practice.   
That leaves Dr. McGary with her claim that Dr. Osevala was motivated by his own 
personal economic interest and thus is capable of concerted action with the Medical 
Center or Susquehanna Health.  The evidence Dr. McGary advances is simply that 
Dr. Osevala made a recommendation to Dr. Manchester that the Medical Center was too 
small to support two CT surgeons.  But in order to prove concerted action between a 
hospital and its staff, “there must be something . . . such as a conscious commitment by 
the medical staff to coerce the hospital into accepting its recommendation.”  Mathews, 87 
F.3d at 639-40 (quoting Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992)).  A mere recommendation does not prove 
concerted action.  Id.  Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
dispute of material fact as to whether Dr. Osevala coerced the Medical Center or 
Susquehanna Health to deny Dr. McGary surgical privileges.  We will therefore affirm 
the grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the Section 1 claim.    
B. Claims Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act “makes it unlawful to monopolize, attempt to 
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize, interstate or international commerce.”  
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 306 (3d Cir. 2007).  We address in 
turn McGary’s three claims under Section 2.   
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1. Monopolization Claim 
To prevail on a monopolization claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the possession 
of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance 
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”  Id. at 306-07.  The District 
Court rejected Dr. McGary’s argument that the Defendants’ use of the 100/100 criteria 
proved they had acted to willfully maintain their monopoly because it found that “at least 
seven doctors met the [100/100] criteria and, consequently, gained surgical 
privileges[.]”  (App. at 10-11.)  Dr. McGary contends that the District Court’s reasoning 
was flawed because six of those doctors were locum tenens physicians who had met 
lower criteria to be granted privileges.8  She also argues the Defendants acted 
anticompetitively by failing to process her application in the manner set forth in the 
hospital’s Bylaws.     
Dr. McGary’s monopolization claim is precluded by Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 
F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984).  In Weiss, the plaintiff argued that a hospital’s denial of his 
application for privileges proved the hospital had willfully acquired or maintained 
                                                 
8 A locum tenes physician is one who temporarily fulfills the obligations of 
another physician.  See Locum tenens, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A 
deputy; a substitute; a representative.”).  Under the Bylaws, an applicant for locum tenens 
privileges must provide documentation of her licensure, training, and professional 
references, among other items, but there does not appear to be any minimum requirement 
for number of surgical procedures performed.  The dispute over other doctors’ 
qualifications is irrelevant because we affirm the District Court’s ruling on other grounds.  
See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We may affirm a District 
Court’s judgment on grounds other than those considered by the District Court itself.”). 
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monopoly power.  Id. at 828.  We held, however, that the hospital in question, “like any 
hospital, would maximize its revenues by giving staff privileges to every qualified doctor 
who applied.”  Id.  By failing to demonstrate what economic motive the hospital would 
have for denying the plaintiff’s application, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the 
hospital acted “willfully” to maintain its monopoly power.  Id. 
So too here.  Dr. McGary has failed to explain, or produce any evidence 
supporting, an economic motive that the Medical Center—the entity that she alleges has 
monopoly power—would have to deny a qualified surgeon any practice 
privileges.  Lacking that evidence, her monopolization claim fails.  Id.  Further, to the 
extent Dr. McGary contends that Dr. Osevala had an anticompetitive motive for his 
action, his motive cannot be imputed to the Medical Center.  Id.  On the contrary, there is 
no reason to believe that rejecting qualified practitioners—particularly those capable of 
offering more sophisticated surgical techniques than current practitioners, as Dr. McGary 
claims she can—would aid the hospital in maintaining monopoly power.  Id.  
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Dr. McGary’s monopolization claim 
fails. 
2. Attempted Monopolization Claim 
To prove attempted monopolization, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the defendant 
has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to 
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”  Broadcom 
Corp., 501 F.3d at 317 (citation omitted).  The District Court determined that 
Dr. McGary’s attempted monopolization claim failed because she could not show that the 
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Defendants had a specific intent to monopolize.  Dr. McGary challenges that conclusion, 
arguing that the Defendants’ use of the 100/100 criteria and failure to follow the 
credentialing process in the Bylaws demonstrates their specific intent to monopolize.   
“[I]n a traditional § 2 claim, a plaintiff would have to point to specific, egregious 
conduct that evinced a predatory motivation and a specific intent to monopolize.  Some 
courts have inferred specific intent from anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct, for 
instance, when business conduct is not related to any apparent efficiency.”  Phila. Taxi 
Ass’n, Inc v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 341 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 211 
(2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted).   
Dr. McGary alleges no such egregious behavior.  Moreover, as noted above, she 
has failed to explain what economic motive the hospital would have to use the 
credentialing process to exclude qualified surgeons—a move that would hurt, not help, it 
acquire or maintain a monopoly.  We fail to see how those actions can demonstrate an 
intent to monopolize.  Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court as to 
Dr. McGary’s attempted monopolization claim under Section 2.   
3. Conspiracy to Monopolize 
Like claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[c]laims for conspiracy to 
monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act also require evidence of a conspiracy” 
between two or more distinct entities.  Gordon, 423 F.3d at 207 & n.16.  For the reasons 
already discussed, the Defendants are incapable of conspiracy in violation of antitrust 
laws.  We will thus affirm the grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on 
Dr. McGary’s claim for conspiracy to monopolize.     
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C. State Law Claims 
Dr. McGary also challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on 
her state law claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective 
contractual relations, and civil conspiracy in restraint of trade. 
1. Breach of Contract Claim 
The contract claim is premised on Susquehanna Health’s Medical Staff Bylaws.  
Dr. McGary argues that Dr. Manchester breached her contractual right to have her 
application processed in the manner set forth in the Bylaws.  In other words, she presses a 
third-party beneficiary theory.9 
Under Pennsylvania law,  
[A] party becomes a third party beneficiary only where both parties 
to the contract express an intention to benefit the third party in the contract 
itself, unless, the circumstances are so compelling that recognition of the 
beneficiary’s right is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties, 
and the performance satisfies an obligation of the promisee to pay money to 
the beneficiary or the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to 
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.   
Scarpitti v. Weborg, 609 A.2d 147, 150-51 (Pa. 1992).   
Dr. McGary relies on the preamble and Article V of the Bylaws to establish what 
she contends are her third-party beneficiary rights.  The preamble states that the Bylaws 
“create a system of mutual rights and obligations among the Hospital(s), members, and 
                                                 
9 In Pennsylvania, “[t]he staff bylaws of a hospital constitute the terms of a legally 
binding contract between the hospital and the doctors on its staff.”  Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 
419 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).  Dr. McGary, however, did not have staff 
privileges at the Medical Center.  Thus, despite the fact that she argues—once, and only 
in passing—that by submitting her application she became a party to the agreement, her 
claim proceeds under a third-party beneficiary theory.  
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other practitioners.”  (App. at 1446.)  She argues that the phrase “other practitioners” is 
clearly intended to refer to applicants for surgical privileges.  Article V governs 
appointment to the hospital’s medical staff and sets forth the requirements for applicants 
and the procedures for processing applications.  Dr. McGary notes that applicants agree 
to be bound by the Bylaws and that unsuccessful applicants are granted hearing and 
appeal rights.   
She has not, however, directed us to any “Pennsylvania decision [that] has 
recognized an applicant for staff privileges as a third-party beneficiary of the medical 
staff bylaws of a private hospital.”  Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 926 (W.D. 
Pa. 1981), aff’d, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982).  The language of the Bylaws does not 
prompt a different understanding, nor do the circumstances compel the conclusion that 
Dr. McGary is a third-party beneficiary of the Bylaws.  She simply did not meet the 
standard for surgical privileges.10  Cf. Petrocco v. Dover Gen. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 642 
                                                 
10 Moreover, even if Dr. McGary were to be considered a third-party beneficiary 
of the Bylaws, her claim still fails, as it does not appear that there was any breach of the 
Bylaws.  Under the Bylaws, the first step of the application processing procedure calls for 
“[t]he Credentials Committee, with assistance from the Medical Director’s office, . . . to 
verify information on the application[] and collect any additional information necessary 
to evaluate the application.”  (App. at 1463 ¶ 5.2-5(a).)  Only once the “verification and 
collection of additional necessary information is accomplished,” is the application passed 
on to “the Credentials Committee and the Chairman of each department in which the 
applicant seeks clinical privileges.”  (App. at 1463 ¶ 5.2-5(a).)  The Bylaws make clear 
that the applicant bears “the burden of producing adequate information for a proper 
evaluation of [her] qualifications, of resolving any reasonable doubts about [her] 
qualifications, and of satisfying requests for information.”  (App. at 1462 ¶ 5.2-4.)  
Dr. Manchester, consistent with his obligations under the Bylaws, “reviewed [her] 
application for completeness” and notified Dr. McGary of (multiple) issues with her 
application, including her failure to satisfy the 100/100 criteria.  (App. at 351.)  She was 
given ample opportunity to rectify those problems.  But she failed to supply the records 
14 
 
A.2d 1016, 1022 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), cert. denied, 649 A.2d 1284 (N.J. 
1994) (table) (comparing a third-party beneficiary claim based on the plaintiff’s claimed 
“contractual right to have his application processed under the bylaws, including the 
provisions for a hearing” to Robinson and concluding that the “Plaintiff in this case was 
not eligible for staff membership under the bylaws as written.  Hence we will not infer 
that the bylaws were intended to protect plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary”).  
Accordingly, her claim fails. 
2. Intentional Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations 
To prove intentional interference with contractual relations, Dr. McGary must 
prove “(1) a prospective contractual relationship; (2) the purpose or intent to harm the 
plaintiff by preventing the relation from occurring; (3) the absence of privilege or 
justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of actual damage 
resulting from the defendant’s conduct.”  Phillips v. Selig, 959 A.2d 420, 428 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2008).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that “where, as in most cases, 
the defendant acts at least in part for the purpose of protecting some legitimate interest 
which conflicts with that of the plaintiff, a line must be drawn and the interests 
evaluated.”  Glenn v. Point Park Coll., 272 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1971) (citation omitted).  
                                                 
needed to verify that she met the required credentialing criteria because those records did 
not exist.  While Dr. McGary complains that her application was not passed on for further 
review, it is not clear that she was entitled to any more review than she received.  See 
Miller, 419 A.2d at 1194 (“Such de minimis deviations from the provisions of the 
hospital bylaws are not the sort of impermissible breach contemplated by the 
[Pennsylvania Supreme] Court … when it established the requirement of strict 
compliance with staff bylaws.”). 
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In drawing that line, the focus is on whether the defendant’s conduct is “sanctioned by 
the ‘rules of the game.’”  Id. (citation omitted).   
The District Court concluded that Dr. McGary had failed to show that the 
Defendants acted with the specific intent to harm her.  Dr. McGary argues, however, that 
the Defendants “had to know that by denying [her] privileges” at the hospital she would 
be prevented from competing in the market.  (Opening Br. at 46.)  That, along with the 
hospital’s concern that Dr. Osevala would not have enough cases and its “bypass[ing]” 
the Bylaws’s application procedures, evidences their specific intent to cause her harm.  
(Opening Br. at 47.)  We disagree.   
As the District Court explained, the Defendants’ denial of Dr. McGary’s 
application shows, at most, that the “Defendants acted with an intent to improve their 
own business”—by not granting privileges to a physician who did not meet their 
credentialing criteria, which they had long before set to ensure quality of patient care, not 
to intentionally harm Dr. McGary.  (App. at 13-14.)  Further, the record shows that, when 
Dr. McGary objected to the criteria as too stringent, Dr. Manchester was sympathetic and 
asked her to research “appropriate numbers and . . . literature” so that the Medical Center 
might revise its criteria.  (App. at 350-51.)  The hospital then did so.   
In short, the Defendants had legitimate interests of their own that they were 
entitled to look to, and there is no evidence that they adopted or applied the credentialing 
criteria to prevent Dr. McGary from practicing at the Medical Center.  Cf. Phillips, 959 
A.2d at 429-30 (listing, as a factor to be considered in determining whether the defendant 
acted with justification, a factor closely related to intent, “the proximity or remoteness of 
16 
 
the actor’s conduct to the interference” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979)).  Thus, the intentional interference with prospective contractual 
relations claim fails.   
3. Civil Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade 
Under Pennsylvania law, a claim for civil conspiracy requires proof “that two or 
more persons combined or agreed with intent to do an unlawful act or to do an otherwise 
lawful act by unlawful means.  Proof of malice, i.e., an intent to injure, is essential in 
proof of a conspiracy.  This unlawful intent must be absent justification.”  Thompson 
Coal, 412 A.2d at 472 (citations omitted).   
The District Court granted summary judgment to the Defendants based on its 
conclusion that they were legally incapable of conspiracy.  Dr. McGary once again 
argues that Dr. Osevala had his own distinct interest in excluding her from practicing at 
the Medical Center, an interest separate from the other Defendants’ interests, making a 
conspiracy possible.  That argument is still wanting.   
Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] single entity cannot conspire with itself and, 
similarly, agents of a single entity cannot conspire among themselves.”  Grose v. Procter 
& Gamble Paper Prods., 866 A.2d 437, 441 (Pa. Super Ct. 2005) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Thompson Coal, 412 A.2d at 472); see also Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-Univ. 
Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that employees and a 
corporation are “one and the same” when employees “act within the scope of their 
employment”).  Dr. McGary does not argue that any of the individual Defendants acted 
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outside the scope of their employment in denying her application for privileges.11  
Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, there is no evidence that Dr. Osevala and the 
Medical Center or Susquehanna Health agreed to deny her application with an intent to 
injure her.  That conclusion is fatal to her civil conspiracy claim.  Rutherfoord, 612 A.2d 
at 508.  Thus, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment on that claim too. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                                 
11 Pennsylvania has rejected a per se rule that parent companies are incapable of 
conspiring with their subsidiaries for purposes of a civil conspiracy claim.  Shared 
Commc’ns Servs. of 1800-80 JFK Blvd. Inc. v. Bell Atl. Props. Inc., 692 A.2d 570, 573-
74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  But, while the Medical Center and Susquehanna Health may be 
capable of conspiring with one another under Pennsylvania law, Dr. McGary has 
presented no evidence, and does not argue, that the Medical Center and Susquehanna 
Health conspired with one another.  As a result, any claim to that effect has been 
forfeited.  See Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Co., 767 F.3d 335, 352 (3d Cir. 2014). 
